I’ve started posting my diagrams created for APR, USBP, etc. over on “Deviantart.” Unless I get bored and wander away (gosh, what are the chances of *that*), the plan is to eventually post virtually *all* of my diagrams, at a rate of about one a day.
Check it out:
Feel free to tell anyone you care to tell.
A Ryan concept for recovery of the Saturn I first stage. Somewhere around here I have a report on using such a system to recover a Saturn I used to launch a Dyna Soar…
The idea was that the stage could glide back to a runway landing in Florida. As memory serves, in order to pull that off some propulsive capability was needed, such as restarting the engines and doing a retro-burn while still above the sensible atmosphere. The stage would return unmanned.
Coming soon to a sky near you, hopefully:
Now available: US Spacecraft Projects #02, the “Spaceplane Special.” This is done in the same style as the other US Aerospace Projects publications, but this issue is focused specifically on lifting spacecraft… and is more than twice as long as usual with more data and more diagrams.
USSP #02 includes:
USSP #02 can be downloaded as a PDF file for only $6:
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Illustrations of a Martin concept from 1961 called “DEIMOS” (Development and Investigation of a Military Orbital System). Pitched to the Air Force, this entailed a modified Titan II launch vehicle, a standard cargo hauler and a scaled-up two-man Mercury capsule (this was before Gemini was finalized). The result was something akin to a smaller version of the later MOL (Manned Orbiting Laboratory). The Titan II described here (modifications unknown) could put a 10,000 pound payload into a 300 nautical mile orbit.
Capabilities and roles of DEIMOS were not provided, but it would presumably serve much the same role as MOL, though simpler and lighter weight: basic science as well as reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. The claim as of August 1961 was that if work began soon DEIMOS could begin flying in 1963.
I’ve made available to all APR Patreon patrons full-rez scan of of an article from Mechanix Illustrated, March, 1956. “Why Don’t We Build an Atom-For-Peace” was written and illustrated by Frank Tinsley and is, to say the least, kinda technologically optimistic. But it demonstrated a difference in psychology between then and now… sixty years ago, thinking this kind of big was not seen as crazy as it would be today.
If this is of interest, please consider signing up to become a patron. For a pittance per month, you get all kinds of aerospace history goodies.
This is one of the more unlikely-looking launch vehicle designs I’ve seen… a 1961 Saturn I first stage with an S-IV second stage and a nuclear upper stage. In and of itself that’s not that unusual… but the upper stage is *really* long and thin and appears to be devoid of a recognizable payload. The result, if it managed to survive launch and bending forces, is that at burnout it would be accelerating *really* hard.
However, the great probability here is that this was not an actual serious engineering study for a launch vehicle, but instead a notional concept, useful for studying the whichness of the why regarding the use of automated systems for nuclear rocket preparation an launch.
A wind tunnel model of the Saturn I, checking specifically for base heating (i.e. heating of the base of the vehicle, between the engines, due to radiant heat from the plumes and convection/conduction from hot exhaust gases recirculating between the engines). This model is odd in that it depicts the clustered booster stage as a straight cylinder; further, there appears to be at least one long fairing up the side (although that could be an artifact of reflections & shadows). I suspect this *may* be a repurposed Atlas model.
A scan of a piece of art from 1961 depicting a Long Beach-class guided missile cruiser launching a Polaris ballistic missile. Note that the caption says that this *will* happen; as it turned out, not only was the Long Beach never equipped with Polarises, it was also the only ship in its class. The US Navy decided that putting strategic nuclear ballistic missiles on easily-spotted and tracked surface ships was less desirable than putting them on far stealthier submarines.
An illustration from the 1980’s, publicized fairly widely by Lockheed to illustrate their thinking for an Advanced Tactical Fighter (which led to the F-22). This almost certainly did *not* represent actual design work on Lockheeds part, but instead pure artistry. This particular version of the artwork depicts a rather apocalyptic color scheme; other versions were rather cheerier.
